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JAPANESE Buddhism finds itself in a challenging period of its history, and unfortunately this period has lasted for 150 years. As the tradition looks 
out across the 21 st century, its path is rutted, for it is moving across terrain 
gouged by social, political, and economic forces since the mid-19th century. 
One of several current challenges is the lack of interest in mainline Buddhist 
sects on the part of young and middle-aged Japanese, most of whom see 
Buddhism as “the funeral business,” a collection of musty, antiquated rituals 
concerning death and memorialization of the dead, topics best left to priests, 
grandmothers, and other elderly folks with an interest in such things. In 
response to this apathy, and the concommitant shortage of priests for small­
er, rural temples, some Buddhist leaders have advocated making the Dharma 
more socially relevant. Though atypical, a few priests have begun engaging 
in new forms of outreach and activism, and some have even stressed the need 
for a Buddhist social ethic that can speak to the contemporary situation of the 
Japanese.1
1 As part of their commitment to developing Buddhist social ethics in Japan, the editors of 
The Eastern Buddhist solicited this article, asking that I survey treatments of Zen war respon­
sibility and offer ideas about how, in light of Buddhist involvement in the war, the formula­
tion of Buddhist social ethics might proceed.
A fruitful starting point for systematic formulation of Buddhist ethics, 
especially if one wishes to avoid abstract, idealized constructions of Bud­
dhist ethics that are divorced from historical actuality, is Buddhist involve­
ment in, if not responsibility for, the Fifteen-Year War (1931-45), as well as
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issues that have earned over into the postwar period, including the question 
of why Japanese Buddhists have been reluctant to look squarely at their 
wartime culpability.
Imperial-Way Buddhism
From the 1920s to the early 1940s Buddhist priests contributed actively to 
Japanese imperialism. They lent their social status and homiletical skills to 
propaganda campaigns (kyoka undo SltiSSi) run by the state to cultivate 
obedient imperial subjects; organized and/or participated actively in patriot­
ic groups; exhorted parishioners to “serve the public” (hoko by enlist­
ing, practicing austerity on the home front, and buying war bonds; engaged 
in monthly “patriotic alms-begging” (hokoku takuhatsu gongyo
IT); donated temple funds for the construction of warplanes; ran officer­
training programs; performed ceremonies and chanted sutras to promote 
Japanese victory; assisted the families of the war dead; served as chaplains 
for troops fighting overseas; and helped “pacify” (senbu SIM) occupied and 
colonized areas and mold colonized Asians into imperial subjects (kominka 
BKIt;).2 With regard to Buddhist contributions to Japanese colonialism on 
the heels of invasion, Ichikawa Hakugen writes, “In the major cities of Asian 
areas into which the ‘emperor’s army’ advanced, shrines were erected, and 
Buddhists, with the exception of a small number of resisters, cooperated 
destructively in the pacification of those areas as crusaders who [as the say­
ing goes] obliterated the self and served the public (messhi-hokd by
2 See Kashiwahara 1990, Yoshida 1970, and Victoria 1997.
3 Ichikawa 1993, vol. 3, p. 10.
disseminating the Imperial Way. . . . [And] under the banner of ‘the august 
virtue’ [of the emperor] they shouldered the burden of waging one front of 
the ‘thought war’ (shisdsen SSiS) directed at turning Taiwanese, Koreans, 
Manchurians, and Mongolians into imperial subjects.”3
Buddhist priests also served state objectives through sermons, lectures, 
and writings, especially in Buddhist newsletters and journals. In their patri­
otic discourse they celebrated the imperial system, the Japanese state, and 
military operations, while philosophically aligning Buddhist teachings with 
constructs in the reigning imperial ideology. For example, they set forth 
arguments that 1) the war Japan was waging across Asia was a holy war; 2) 
Japanese actions in that war were expressions of compassion; 3) the deaths 
of brave, self-sacrificial soldiers embodied the Buddhist doctrine of no-self;
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4) through this Buddhistic self-sacrifice Japanese could repay their debt (om 
Jg) to the emperor;4 5) the Japanese military was attempting to establish a 
pure land here on earth, with the emperor equivalent to Amida.5
4 With this argument they linked the Confucian notion of the benevolent emperor with 
Buddhist formulations of on, the blessings one receives from others and the indebtedness one 
incurs because of those blessings. (In East Asian Buddhism, the four main on (shion El®) are 
the blessings one receives from 1) the Buddha, 2) the ruler, 3) one’s parents, and 4) all sen­
tient beings.) In this way they plugged Buddhist doctrinal teaching into the crux of the impe­
rial ideology: a benevolent emperor bestowing blessings on grateful and obedient subjects 
who, in turn, are willing to sacrifice themselves for the emperor in repayment of their debt to 
him. For further discussion of this meshing of Buddhist doctrine with imperial ideology, see 
Ives 1999.
5 Such arguments appear in Buddhist journals and newsletters throughout the early-Showa 
period (1926-1945), as Brian Victoria delineates in Zen at War.
6 For example, see Sharf 1995.
7 The “way of the warrior,” the warrior code or ethos.
This historical record prompts a number of questions, not the least of 
which is how we might square wartime Zen Buddhism with popular— 
usually ahistorical and idealized—representations of Zen as a path of com­
passionate wisdom free from political cooptation or, in its most distorted 
portrayal, as the path of awakened eccentrics engaged in poetry and pranks 
in the mountains of East Asia. Given that scholars have already begun to 
address this question elsewhere,6 7I will focus here on the question of how we 
might account for “Imperial-Way Buddhism” (kodd biikkyo espe­
cially “Imperial-Way Zen” (kodo zen S51W).
Causes oflmperial-Way Zen
The two Zen scholars (and priests) most known for investigating “Imperial- 
Way Zen” are Brian Victoria (1939-) and Ichikawa Hakugen rhUISK 
(1902-86). In his controversial book, Zen at War, Victoria outlines the 
nationalistic and militaristic bent of prominent Zen figures in the first part of 
the Showa period (1926-1989). Though he does not work over his important 
data theoretically, in several places he does offer his own interpretations and 
assessments.
Victoria ascribes Zen collaboration with Japanese imperialism to connec­
tions between Zen and bushido encapsulated in the expression, ken-
zen-ichinyo AD, the “unity of Zen and the sword.” This connection,
especially as interpreted by prewar and wartime Zen Buddhists, is “the key 
to understanding the eventual emergence of‘imperial-state Zen’ (kokoku zen 
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jggO).”8 In his book, however, Victoria provides little specific evidence to 
convince his readers that it was primarily the Zxn-bushido connection per se, 
not other factors, that gave rise to the nationalist bent of Zen leaders in the 
first half of the 20th century. True, Zen figures cloaked their nationalism in 
the rhetoric of kenzen-ichinyo, but is the Zen connection to bushidd the rea­
son they were eagerly patriotic? One cannot help wondering whether there 
might not have been other, perhaps even more important, factors that gener­
ated nationalist Zen before and during the Fifteen-Year War.
8 Victoria 1997, p. 95.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 116.
11 Ibid., p. 144.
Interestingly, Victoria himself points to other causal factors when he 
writes, . . what did post-Meiji Zen adherents find in the relationship 
between Zen and Bushido that justified their own fervent support of Japan’s 
war effort?”9 With this wording Victoria seems to construe the Twx-bushidb 
connection not so much as the main cause of Zen support for Japanese impe­
rialism but as a construct readily available when Zen leaders sought an ex 
post facto justification for their support of imperialism. This wording betrays 
his recognition that factors other than the historical Z.en-bushidb connec­
tion—many of which he points out in the book—may have been the main 
factors that led Zen to its imperialist posture and that when Zen figures want­
ed to valorize or embellish their support for Japanese imperialism and mili­
tarism they deployed rhetoric about the inherent congruity between the paths 
of monks and fighting men.
Victoria argues that the Zen-hws/zzdo connection not only generated 
“Imperial-Way Zen” but also had a bearing on Japanese militarism in gener­
al. To support this claim he zeroes in on Taigi (Ad “Great Duty”), a book 
by Lieutenant Colonel Sugimoto Goro: “The writings of one military officer 
. . . indicate the type of soldier this [Zen] training produced and are a power­
ful testimonial to the influence that Bushido, incorporating the unity of Zen 
and the sword, had on both imperial soldiers and the general public.”10 11He 
later adds, “To the war’s bitter end, the Way of the Warrior played an impor­
tant role in all aspects of Japanese society.”11 And close to that bitter end, 
according to Victoria, “The unity of Zen and the sword advocated by such 
Zen leaders as [Yamazaki] Ekiju and [D.T.] Suzuki had come to this: draft-
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ing young boys into special attack units to become infamous kamikaze (di­
vine wind) pilots needed on a one-way trip to oblivion.”12
12 Ibid., p. 129.
13 I would argue that the Zen-samurai connection had more to do with institutional symbio­
sis than with any Zen input to bushidd or any linkage between Zen and the way one wields a 
sword.
14 Ibid., p. 99.
We might ask, however, whether there were factors other than Zen train­
ing that influenced Sugimoto. And even if it was Zen training that enabled 
Sugimoto to wage war without flinching and face death with selfless service 
to the emperor foremost in his mind, how typical was he? Did Zen training 
play much of a role in the will-power, martial effectiveness, and sacrificial 
death of other soldiers? (One might also inquire into the actual extent earlier 
soldiers, the samurai ostensibly shaped by bushidd and Zen, actually did sit 
zazen, meet with Zen masters, and thereby cultivate the mental states and 
insights claimed to be the fruits of Zen practice.) And even if we allow for 
the possibility that bushidd did in fact exert a large influence on military fig­
ures like Sugimoto, does that necessarily indicate a major Zen influence? 
Victoria highlights Buddhist facets of bushidd but devotes less ink to its 
overwhelmingly Confucian character.13
As indicated in his statement about Sugimoto, Victoria does maintain that 
Zen training exerted a major influence on this soldier, and he further writes, 
“The belief that the power resulting from Zen training could be converted 
into military power was to become an ever more important part of the Zen 
contribution to Japan’s war effort.”14 But how might one prove that the 
belief in some special power cultivated by Zen practice became an “ever 
more important part of the Zen contribution to the war effort,” or that the 
actual cultivation of that power in Zen training constituted the key formative 
moment in Sugimoto’s career? That is to say, how much influence did that 
belief really have on military figures and the war? And going beyond mere 
belief, how many military types actually practiced Zen, gained special power 
from that practice, and converted it into some sort of military power?
The challenge Victoria faces here, as with the issue of the exact role of 
bushidd in motivating actions by Zen figures and others, is that of empirical 
evidence. He acknowledges this difficulty: “Leading Zen figures made 
unsurpassed efforts to foster loyalty to the emperor and make spiritually 
strong soldiers. Did anyone notice? That is to say, was the imperial military
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actually influenced by their words and actions?”15 He continues, “A quanti­
tative answer to this question, it must be admitted, is almost certainly beyond 
the realm of historical research.”16
15 Ibid., p. 114.
16 Ibid.
17 Ichikawa 1993b, p. 124.
In terms of kamikaze pilots, though Victoria ascribes to the Zen-bushido 
connection a causal role (“come to this”) in the creation of what the Japanese 
military referred to as “special attack” (tokko units, one can reasonably 
wonder whether the Zen-sword link really played any causal role, much less 
a significant one, in the formation of those units. Pointing out that Zen 
figures like Yamazaki Ekiju lLiiiisflOH (1882-1961) and D.T. Suzuki (1870- 
1966) joined the rhetorical game of extolling the virtues of self-sacrifice and 
other apparently Zen facets of bushidd is one thing, but to construe the unity 
of Zen and the sword as playing a significant causal role in desperate tactical 
decisions made by military brass on the verge of defeat is an entirely differ­
ent matter.
In short, Victoria has not adequately made his case for the Z&n-bushidd 
connection as the main cause of Imperial-Way Zen, the martial tenacity of 
military figures other than Sugimoto, or kamikaze attacks. Nor has he suffi­
ciently supported his claim that bushidd, regardless of the degree to which 
Zen is constitutive of it, played a major causal role in Japanese militarism 
and expansionist imperialism overall. Nevertheless, scholars and practicing 
Buddhists are indebted to Victoria for bringing to greater light the ideology 
and actions of Zen figures during the Fifteen-Year War.
So what might be causal factors behind Imperial-Way Zen besides the 
Zen-bushido connection? Ichikawa Hakugen turns his critical gaze toward 
Zen epistemology and metaphysics. He argues that in their attempt to attain 
“peace of mind” (anjin by extricating themselves from discriminating 
thought, “becoming one with things” tyiarikiru), and “accepting and accord­
ing with circumstances” (pin ’nun f£iS), Zen Buddhists have never laid an 
epistemological groundwork on which to criticize or resist political actuality 
and, in fact, have usually accommodated if not actively supported it.17 In 
Buddhists’ War Responsibility (Bukkyd-sha no sensd-sekinin
{£, 1970), Ichikawa expands the scope of his discussion beyond Zen and 
notes that Buddhists in general deploy the metaphor of the mirror as that 
which reflects all things “just as they are,” and “the fundamental spirit and
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character of Buddhism is tolerance, harmony, and non-resistance.”18 More­
over, Japanese have celebrated harmony as a salient cultural characteristic of 
Japan, as seen in the imperial ideology promulgated in the Ministiy of 
Education’s 1937 text, Kokutai no hongi Fundamental Principles
18 Ibid., p. 6.
19 Ibid., p. 10.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
of the National Polity), which mobilized the social ethic of “Great Harmony” 
(daiwa Afa) from such early sources as the Seventeen-Article Constitution 
(604 CE). “This ethic strengthened the trajectory of inferiors obeying the 
wishes of their superiors in the system of ‘one sovereign and many sub­
jects.’ . . . This amounted to the fanaticism of a ‘harmonization’ (wagd ft ft) 
that was completely intolerant of and hysterically combative toward ‘Reds’ 
and ‘traitors’ (hikokumin JfHK).”19
Ichikawa lifts up other facets of Japanese Mahayanist philosophy that pre­
disposed Zen Buddhists to float on the collective drift into Japanese imperi­
alism. In his writings he repeatedly critiques elements of Zen epistemology 
and metaphysics that are based on Huayan Jp. Kegon) Buddhism. 
Rather than unpacking the political implications of the “unobstructed inter­
pretation of thing and thing” (jiji-muge Zen has chosen to focus on
“seeing the universal principle in the particular thing” (yz no naka ni ri o 
mint WOTlTli5:^-5). This stance has led Zen to valorize actuality or cer­
tain particulars therein, such as the emperor or the imperial household, and 
obfuscate distinctions between the “is” and the “ought.”
Ichikawa further criticizes the Mahayana logic of “differences [or dis­
criminations] are none other than equality” (shabetsu-soku-byddd
for having “functioned as a logic supportive and protective of the [war­
time] system.”20 Specifically, Japanese Buddhists often denounced leftist 
thought as an evil egalitarianism that ran contrary to this Buddhist logic, 
“even though . . . the common goal of various types of communist thought is 
the construction of a society that takes into account differences in terms of 
people contributing in accordance with their ability and receiving in accor­
dance with their need. Moreover, we [Japanese] did not denounce decisively 
as evil differentiation and evil equality the movement to turn Taiwanese, 
Koreans, Manchurians, and Mongolians [equally] into imperial subjects, 
which was based on extremely discriminatory concepts and policies.”21
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When coupled with the doctrine of “cause and effect over the three worlds 
[of past, present, and future]” (sanze-inga this logic has also
served to justify class differences and social discrimination in Japan.22
22 Ichikawa’s argument has been echoed recently by “Critical Buddhism” (hihan bukkyd ftt 
WAft).
23 Ibid., p. 12.
24 Scholars in Zen Studies have begun to argue both that the role of special “experience” is 
less central to Zen than D.T. Suzuki and others have made it out to be, and that the construct 
of ineffable, pure, unmediated experience beyond the duality of subject and object is largely 
unintelligible.
25 Victoria mentions “the overall relationship between institutional Buddhism and the 
Japanese state” (Victoria 1997, p. 95) and the phenomenon of “nation-protecting Buddhism” 
(gokoku Bukkyd HBUAS) as one part of “the question of the doctrinal and historical relation­
ship between Buddhism and the state” (Victoria 1997, p. 157).
Ichikawa further criticizes what D.T. Suzuki termed the “logic of sokuhi 
(BPI^)” and his friend Nishida Kitaro called the “the identity of absolute con­
tradictories.” These philosophical constructs, “in which non-freedom is 
none other than freedom, in which ‘to become servant of every situation’ (to 
obliterate the self and serve the public in the holy war) is to ‘become master 
of every situation’ (as in Mahayana Zen), played the same social and politi­
cal role [of supporting and protecting the imperial system].”23 In other 
words, the logic of identity in negation and contradiction, and of the affir­
mation that emerges from negation, can further subvert distinctions between 
“is” and “ought”; and the type of freedom cultivated by Zen, however liber­
ating existentially, may actually cause acquiescence and political bondage.
Though many scholars would challenge Ichikawa’s representation of Zen 
experience,24 if we grant for the sake of the argument that prominent Zen fig­
ures did experience things in ways that undermined critical distance and pre­
disposed them to accord with their actuality, and that this epistemology has 
been grounded in a metaphysics that valorizes actuality and obfuscates dis­
tinctions between fact and value, we are still left with the question of the 
extent to which these epistemological and metaphysical factors account for 
“Imperial-Way Zen.” That is to say, though these factors might help explain 
why Zen figures did not resist, they do not fully account for the active and 
eager collaboration Ichikawa, Victoria, and others have documented.
Arguably a better direction in which to seek the causes Imperial-Way Zen 
is institutional history, which Victoria and Ichikawa both discuss but gener­
ally subordinate to their arguments about bushidb and Zen epistemology.25
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Since Buddhism first arrived in Japan as a gift from a Korean king in the 
sixth century, Japanese Buddhist leaders and institutions have, as a rule,26 
functioned in a symbiotic relationship with other individuals and institutions 
exercising political power.27 As Ichikawa, Yoshida Kyuichi, Nakano Kyotoku, 
James Ketelaar, Sheldon Garon, Brian Victoria, and other scholars have 
pointed out, this pattern continued from the Meiji Restoration through the 
end of the Fifteen-Year War, and in some respects with greater urgency than 
in the past. From the 1860s institutional Buddhism confronted a series of 
crises: the loss of property and revenues during and after the brief repression 
of Buddhism (haibutsu-kishaku gFUYSf') at the beginning of the Meiji peri­
od; erosion of the parishioner system (danka seido and the deriva­
26 Exceptions to this are seen, for example, in the history of True Pure Land and Nichiren 
Buddhism in pre-modem Japan.
27 Given the ways in which Buddhism has been part of the configuration of political power, 
as seen in what historian Kuroda Toshio terms the kenmon-taisei tSFTlWJ or influential-par­
ties system in the Kamakura and Muromachi periods, one cannot easily analyze the situation 
in terms of the relationship between Buddhism and the government, for such wording implies 
a separation that does not necessarily obtain through most of Japanese history.
28 See Garon 1997, ch. 2.
tive wealth and power of Tokugawa Buddhism as the Meiji government 
eliminated temple registration (shumon-aratame SFISfcfe) and ordered all 
Japanese to register at Shinto shrines {ujiko-aratame KYdkfe); the loss of 
followers as industrialization and urbanization led parishioners away from 
rural family temples and in many cases toward “new religions” (shinko 
shiikyd WtRSr®) that proselytized to disenfranchised and disenchanted urban 
workers; government restrictions on Buddhism in the 1930s; doctrinal strug­
gles and internal criticisms by sectarian reformers; and external criticism by 
Marxists and Shinto ideologues in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
In crisis, mainline Buddhist sects by the 1920s had come to share with 
government officials an adversarial relationship with both new religious 
movements and Japanese who were leveling Marxist criticisms of religion 
and the state, organizing or joining unions, participating in communist and 
socialist political parties, or directing their allegiance to the Commintem.28 
New religious movements and leftist institutions were luring away parish­
ioners, thus catching the attention of sectarian Buddhist leaders; they were 
also lifting up objects of allegiance transcendent of the emperor and forming
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mass movements seemingly beyond governmental control, thus worrying the 
state.29
29 Garon 1997, pp. 83-84.
30 I offer a more detailed analysis of this in a forthcoming article, “Buddhism and the 
‘Spiritual Mobilization’ of Japan, 1912-1945.”
This state of affairs provided an opportunity for Buddhist institutions to 
align with the state in the face of common adversaries and thereby reclaim 
some of the patronage and status lost at the beginning of the Meiji period. 
Seizing this opportunity, Buddhist priests readily agreed to participate in 
propaganda campaigns orchestrated by the Home Ministry and the Ministry 
of Education to eradicate “dangerous thought.” And in the 1930s and early 
1940s, while tightly regulated by the state, Buddhist leaders bolstered their 
social and political position further by cooperating with the war effort.30 
(This is not to say that Buddhist leaders were narrowly self-interested, crass 
opportunists, for surely mixed in with this opportunism was patriotism, cul­
tivated by the Ministry of Education and other institutions since the 19th cen­
tury.)
What we see in the early-Showa period is a modem instance of “Bud­
dhism for the protection of the realm” (gokoku bukkyd SHIA®), or what has 
been termed “protecting the Dharma, protecting the realm” (gohd-gokoku ® 
These expressions have traditionally been read as indicating that cer­
tain Buddhist rituals and sutras can serve to protect the country, making it 
safe and stable, and hence Buddhism ought to be protected and promulgated 
by the government. In early-Showa Buddhism, Zen included, we see this 
logic at work, especially in the sense of “protecting the Dharma by protect­
ing the country,” that is, protecting Buddhist institutional interests by sup­
porting the Japanese state.
War Responsibility and Postwar Buddhist Ethics
In light of this historical record, hovering over Zen and other sects of 
Japanese Buddhism is the question of the extent to which Buddhist leaders 
and institutions should bear responsibility for Japan’s expansionist mili­
tarism—for the Fifteen-Year War—and perhaps more importantly, the 
question of what Buddhists have said or done since 1945 about that respon­
sibility.
In wartime Japan, political action ranged across a spectrum: acts that 
helped cause or guide (shidd Js®) Japanese belligerence; eager collaboration
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in response to causal actions by others (yokusan MR); acquiescence or ide­
ological conversion (tenko $e|h]) and consequent collaboration; inadvertent 
co-optation; the maintenance of a neutral stance;31 resistance through non­
cooperation; resistance through active steps to reject or change the state of 
affairs. War responsibility (sensd-sekinin concerns actions in war,
31 Of course, a theoretical, not actual, possibility.
32 Jonathan Glover writes, “In legal context, to say that someone is responsible for an action 
may be to say that he is liable to the normal legal consequences of it. To say that someone is 
morally responsible for what he does may be to say that he can legitimately be praised or 
blamed if either of these responses is appropriate to the action in question.” Glover 1970, p. 
19.
33 This opens up the difficult questions of whether Buddhism allows for free will and 
whether we can talk intelligibly about responsibility in the absence of a doctrine of free will.
34 Glover 1970, p. 3.
or in support of war, that entail moral or legal accountability.32 For this dis­
cussion, war responsibility concerns not only specific actions by Buddhists 
that served the objectives of Japanese imperialism (sins of commission), but 
also the acts Buddhists could and should have done as expressions of 
Buddhist ethical values (sins of omission).
In general, as Aristotle and others have argued, responsibility is intelligi­
ble in a moral sense as opposed to a natural-causative sense (as in “The 
bright sun was responsible for my sunburn”) when a person has the ability to 
choose and act without excessive outside coercion, is aware of the possible 
result of actions, and, without diminished capacity, intentionally and volun­
tarily chooses and commits a particular action.33 In Responsibility, Jonathan 
Glover writes that thinkers usually assume that “responsibility is an identifi­
able factor that may at any particular time be present or absent, or even 
‘diminished.’ To be responsible for one’s actions is thought of as equivalent 
to being in a certain mental state. English law sometimes speaks in terms of 
the presence of a ‘guilty mind’ (mens rea). . . .”34
Most ethicists agree that we cannot be held morally responsible for actions 
we were forced to do or could not avoid doing. Some Japanese have argued 
that indeed they really had no choice, given the coercive power invested in 
the thought police of the Home Ministry and the military police (kenpeitai ® 
), and the threat of incarceration, torture, economic ruin, and social ostra- 
cization. In response to this argument, Victoria applies a strictly calibrated 
yardstick:
25
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST XXXIII, 2
Large-scale resistance, of course, never occurred, but those few 
Buddhists who did oppose Japan’s war policies demonstrated that 
resistance was possible if one were prepared to pay the price. Each 
and every Japanese Buddhist did have a choice to make.35
35 Victoria 1997, p.78.
36 This line of inquiry could lead, among several possibilities, to a type of “Buddhist real­
ism” akin to the “Christian realism” Reinhold Niebuhr sets forth in Moral Man and Immoral 
Society. A potentially fruitful point of reference for Buddhist ethical reflection on the nature 
and proper place of compassion and nonviolence is Niebuhr’s provocative argument that 
Jesus’s love ethic is an ideal that ought to be striven for but ought not to be taken as the main 
guiding principle when responding to international conflicts that may call for what Niebuhr 
claims is the ethically permissible and legitimate use of violence.
37 Ichikawa 1993a, p. 164.
38 Ichikawa 1993c, p. 371.
While resistance was certainly an option at that time, there was, as Victoria 
rightly points out, a price to pay, a very high price. When Buddhist leaders 
did speak out or actively resist, they risked losing their priestly status (i.e., 
their livelihood, no small loss for married priests with wives and children to 
support) and being imprisoned. And when political prisoners resisted de­
mands for recantation (tenko fil&l), they could expect to be tortured until they 
caved in and recanted. In other words, there was plenty of room for Japanese 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers, but the high price may have silenced Buddhists of 
conscience who might otherwise have spoken up. The ethical question that 
emerges from this, then, is how, in the midst of complex historical actuali­
ties, to weigh and evaluate ethical choices vis-a-vis Buddhist ideals, espe­
cially the pervasive sutra discourse on bodhisattvas that portrays awakened 
and compassionate Buddhists as willing to pay the highest price.36
So what is the nature of Japanese Buddhists’ war responsibility, and do the 
narrowed range of options in the early-Shawa and high stakes of certain of 
those options reduce culpability? Most importantly, how have Japanese 
Buddhists themselves addressed this question?
Ichikawa complicates things from the start when he claims that Zen’s non­
attached, aesthetic way of being (furyu no kydgai ®©$S) allows little 
room for responsibility.37 “Inheriting the spirit of the Seventeen-Article 
Constitution, the ethics of action in Japanese Buddhism provides no place for 
the realization of responsibility.”38 To Ichikawa, the way of being of 
Japanese Zen finds expression in Dogen’s statements, “To study the self is to 
forget the self” and “without thinking of good or evil, without handling affir-
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mation or negation,” and hence when Zen is “practiced in union with ‘the 
[Shinto] Way of according with the kami and not putting things into words’ 
(kannagara kotoage senu michi an ethic of responsi­
bility cannot be established.”39 For this reason, from Ichikawa’s perspective 
it was no surprise that up until the 1960s when he was making these state­
ments about responsibility, Zen institutions had not yet seriously raised the 
issue of their war responsibility.40
39 Ibid., pp. 371-72.
40 Ichikawa 1993a, p. 164. Since then, Soto Zen has rectified this void by issuing a declara­
tion of repentance (sanshabun in 1992. See Victoria 1997, pp. 153-57, for a discus­
sion of this Soto declaration and three other statements by Japanese Buddhist sects since 1945.
41 On August 28, 1945, as American troops arrived at Atsugi Air Force Base, Higashikuni 
told Japanese reporters that what was needed most was the “collective repentance of the hun­
dred million” (ichioku sozange). See Dower 1999, p. 496.
42 Literally, “philosophy as the Way of repentance.” The book was translated into English 
by Takeuchi Yoshinori (with Valdo Viglielmo and James W. Heisig) as Philosophy as 
Metanoetics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
43 Ichikawa 1997, vol. 4, p. 371.
44 Ibid, p. 382.
45 He notes how even the emperor apologized vertically to the imperial ancestors.
One might retort here that Japanese Buddhists did feel responsibility at the 
end of the war. Soon after the surrender, many Japanese engaged in mass 
repentance (ichioku sozange — at the request of Prime Minister
Higashikuni MA® (Naruhiko 1887-1990),41 and Buddhist priests
signed on to this show of repentance, as did Buddhist philosophers like 
Tanabe Hajime 0322% (1885-1962), who in April of 1946 published 
Zangedd to shite no tetsugaku LASAT/2 Ichikawa argues, how­
ever, “Insofar as the war started with an imperial decision (seidan SW) and 
ended with an imperial decision, no consciousness of responsibility arose. 
The only responsibility was vis-a-vis the emperor for the defeat.”43 That is to 
say, the repentance was directed toward the emperor—repentance for not 
having won the war—rather than toward any acts the Japanese committed in 
that war or toward the war as a whole. Higashikuni’s approach “absolved the 
emperor of any responsibility for the war, spread responsibility for the defeat 
equally among the Japanese without any distinctions, and, needless to say, 
indicated the non-existence of any consciousness of responsibility toward 
the peoples of Asia.”44 Ichikawa refers to this as “vertical responsibility,”45 
a type of responsibility that provides no basis for “horizontal” responsibility 
toward other ordinary people, especially non-Japanese. Renowned political 
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scientist Maruyama Masao wrote that the call to collective repentance func­
tioned like a squid’s ink to obfuscate true responsibility and allow those who 
should have shouldered responsibility to elude danger.46
46 Maruyama Masao, “Shiso no kotoba,” Shiso, 381 (March 1956), p. 322; cited by Dower 
1999, p. 496.
47 Sugawara Jiho AKWA, Nihon Shuho □ AAA (February 1947); quoted by Ichikawa 
(without page number) 1993a, p. 163.
48 Ibid., p. 164.
In short, to Ichikawa, the collective repentance of the hundred million 
(ichioku sozange), like its wartime derivation, the sacrificial death of the 
hundred million (ichioku gyokusai — ffiAiA), is void of any rigorous moral 
sense of responsibility and lacks what he terms an “ethics of character” 
(jinkaku rinri A$#fell).
But separate from the question of the type of responsibility they and other 
Japanese should have taken for the war, Zen Buddhists may have learned 
from their mistakes and started taking less of an acritical, accomodationist, 
and easily co-optable stance, especially when freed in August of 1945 from 
oppressive state institutions. Judging from the following statement by Zen 
master Sugiwara Jiho, however, while “Imperial-Way Zen” may have 
stopped in 1945, Zen accomodationism did not:
Without being biased, we should think of ourselves as a boat and 
proceed without contending against the drift of the times. Reli­
gionists and ordinary people out to think carefully about this. ... If 
we were to go against the drift we could not move forward, and for 
this reason we should accommodate and acquiesce (junno JUiJS), 
or, more bluntly put, we have no other path but to listen and do 
what America says.47
Ichikawa comments that in this statement “the kind of self that has autono­
mous character (jinkaku At#) and criticizes and resists the drift of the times 
does not exist. And insofar as individual character does not exist, there is no 
place in which responsibility can be established. An ‘ethic of emotions’ 
(shinjd no rinri may emerge but an ‘ethic of responsibility’
(sekinin no rinri WffiOlraS) cannot.”48 As a corrective, Ichikawa calls for 
postwar Buddhists to cultivate a “modem,” “autonomous” character and 
critical intellectuality (chisei ftflt).
In his attempt to cultivate this critical autonomy in himself and thereby 
come to terms with his own—and Zen’s—wartime culpability, Ichikawa 
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expands the construct of war responsibility: “Fundamentally, responsibility 
for war is responsibility for peace. War responsibility is not something that 
first emerges upon the outbreak of fighting. [Before then,] in the midst of 
peace, it exists as a responsibility for peace. We did not correctly or effec­
tively transcend the desirable image of a human being (kitai sareru ningenzd
AFsW)49 promoted by Great Imperial Japan.”50 Ichikawa notes 
that from the 19th century, amongst Japanese Buddhists “there were almost 
no critics of the Imperial Constitution [1889] and the Imperial Rescript on 
Education [1890] ... or activists engaging in ‘destroying the false and 
revealing the true’ (haja-kenshd ®WJUE) relative to State Shinto and the 
system of the unity of rites and rule (saisei-itchi &).”51 Eventually, the 
culpability for failing to promote peace and freedom in the prewar period 
devolved into war responsibility. This constitutes the kind of “pious derelic­
tion” that Ichikawa together with Bonhoeffer have discerned “in the ‘virtue’ 
of religious people who sit as spectators to historical evil in the world while 
maintaining their personal purity.”52 Ichikawa tells his Japanese readers, 
“Our culpability extends through the prewar, wartime, and postwar [peri­
ods],”53 and hence it is not sufficiently constructive to reflect simply in terms 
of iw responsibility. Had Japanese taken active responsibility for peace and 
freedom in the prewar period, Ichikawa argues, the war might not have 
occurred, and even if it had, responsibility would not have been such a lin­
gering postwar issue for most Japanese.54 Ichikawa adds provocatively, “In 
this sense, the Japanese Communist Party cannot evade responsibility for the 
war either.”55
49 Ichikawa appears to be pulling this expression from the Central Education Council’s 
Nineteenth Special Committee, chaired by Kyoto School philosopher Kosaka Masaaki, which 
in 1965 issued its “Desirable Image of a [Japanese] Human Being,” inclusive of the state­
ment, “To revere and love the mother country of Japan is identical with revering and loving 
the emperor.” Ichikawa 1993a, pp. 153-54.
50 Ichikawa 1993b, p. 8.
51 Ibid., p. 9.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 8.
54 Obviously, the complexity of the ongoing postwar debate (or, in some quarters, the lack 
of debate) about war responsibility derives from an array of complicating factors, including 
the cover MacArthur and court officials provided Hirohito after the war, the orthodox focus­
ing of blame and responsibility on wartime military leaders, conservative portrayals of the war 
as one of liberation from western imperialism, and the dearth of coverage of the war in 
Japanese schools.
55 Ichikawa 1993b, pp. 8-9.
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Ichikawa elaborates on this responsibility for peace and freedom, claiming 
that a key issue for postwar Buddhists to consider is their responsibility for 
ignorance. In terms of the Eightfold Path, this is culpability for lacking Right 
Understanding and Right Thought (albeit as interpreted by Ichikawa).
Specifically, it is responsibility for our being rendered stupid and 
fanatical by national education (kokumin-kydiku BKSW) in a 
broad sense.56 This ignorance and fanaticism was expanded and 
strengthened through our lack of discerning courage, which 
derived from our negligence, selfishness, and cowardice, that is, 
our crafty actuality-ism (genjitsu-shugi Ti'jETtt)57 and attitude of 
peace-at-any-price (kotonakare-shugi This is evi­
56 Ichikawa’s analysis parallels that of David H. Jones, who in Moral Responsibility in the 
Holocaust critiques the claim that “people who have been socialized [or educated] in a bad 
political culture cannot justifiably be held responsible, or at least not fully responsible, for 
some of their immoral or evil conduct.” (Jones 1999, p. 99) Jones defines political culture as 
“certain values, attitudes, knowledge, and beliefs shared by members of a political communi­
ty,” and it “provides the specific attitudes and orientations that members of the community 
have toward the political system, its processes, and their role in it.” (Ibid., p. 104). Jones is 
drawing from Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in 
Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 13-15), and he construes “bad 
political culture” as lacking such characteristics as respect for the rale of law; support for cor­
nerstones of constitutional democracy like “equality of citizenship, an independent judiciary, 
protection of civil liberties, and electoral accountability of the government”; participation by 
citizens; “solidarity, trust, and tolerance”; and political parties committed to the common 
good (Ibid., p. 104). Buddhist analysis of the political culture in Japan before, during, and 
after the war could constitute another valuable step in the formulation of a rigorous Buddhist 
social ethic.
57 The aforementioned tendency to accept and valorize actuality.
58 Ichikawa 1993b, p. 9.
59 Ibid.
dent, for example, in our becoming ‘voluntary’ objects of the sys­
tematic manipulation of information by the authorities.58
The failure to embody Right Understanding and Right Thought, and by 
extension the Dharma as the ultimate foundation of the self, constitutes “cul­
pability relative to the self and to truth. . . . This is self-deception by humans 
who might otherwise have been expected to seek truth and peace.”59
Looking to overcome postwar ignorance, Ichikawa points out that during 
the war “Japanese shouldered the great duty (taigi AU) of bringing about 
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‘eternal peace in East Asia’ through a ‘holy war’ (seisen JB®) waged by the 
nation as the descendents of the Sun Goddess and grounded in the ‘sacred 
spirit of the imperial ancestors’ (koso-kosd no shinrei Bfi 1^®^! ).”60 For 
this reason, Ichikawa claims, “we must not grasp the experience of the war 
merely as such; rather, we must grasp and reflect on it thoroughly as the 
‘experience of holy war,’ which is a combination of the experience of war 
and the experience of the imperial system. If either criticism of the imperial 
system or self-criticism of our internalized imperial ethos is lacking, our 
efforts will not be exhaustive.”61 In other words, Japanese Buddhists must 
not treat the war simply Buddhistically as a matter of violence (Skt. himsa) 
or the product of psychological entanglements (Skt. Mesas') and karma, but 
recognize that the war was waged (and applauded by Buddhists) in conjunc­
tion with the Japanese imperial system, whose dominance in early-Showa 
Japan led Buddhist leaders and others to portray Japanese imperialist aggres­
sion as a “holy war.” Not to take into account this historical specificity is for 
Buddhist thinkers to run the risk of obfuscating if not evading personal and 
institutional accountability by addressing the war in universal, abstract 
Buddhist terms—as something apart from themselves and their sects—and 
taking the ostensibly moral high ground of a quick-and-easy “pacifist” 
stance in postwar Japan.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.,pp. 9-10.
62 Here and there in his writings Ichikawa advocates expanding the doctrine of wisdom 
(Skt. prajna) to include historical discernment. Though he does not elaborate on what exactly 
this would entail, one might consider the ways in which the Buddhist insight into the psycho­
dynamics of the clinging and defensiveness of the individual ego could be expanded into a 
discernment of the clinging and defensiveness of collective egos, whether the Japanese during 
the war or other societies.
Central to the endeavor to grasp the war in all of its historical particulari­
ty is the crucial need for clear recognition of the past—in a sense, the foster­
ing of authentic memory—as the basis for accepting accountability and 
avoiding the repetition of past mistakes. At this point in Japanese postwar 
history, Buddhist thinkers can join other Japanese in grappling with the high­
ly contested memory of Japanese imperialism and the attempts by some 
voices to establish an official, sanitized memory of the war.62
As a further means of grappling with the experience of the “holy war” and 
establishing a new Buddhist social ethic, Ichikawa urges his fellow Japanese 
Buddhists to examine not only the war but also at the range of issues
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surrounding the postwar imperial system, the military-industrial complexes 
of dominant countries, and the roles U.S. bases in Japan have played in the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the containment of China, and, by extension, 
“the causing of unhappiness across Asia.”63
63 Ichikawa 1993b, p. 13. Ichikawa refers to the U.S. bases as the karmic fruit of Japan’s 
having waged its “holy war.”
64 Such as the attack on Nagasaki mayor Motoshima Hitoshi after his 1989 comments about 
then-dying Hirohito’s war responsibility.
65 Ibid., p. 49.
66 Ibid., p. 44.
67 Ibid., p. 55.
68 Ibid., p. 56.
Here a devil’s advocate might chime in that even though Buddhist sects 
may not have readily issued public declarations of war responsibility, they 
have learned from their past mistakes, so much so that they are no longer 
doomed to repeat them (even if Sugiwara and others showed little evidence 
of this right after the war), and they are now firmly committed to peace. But 
if that degree of change has indeed been wrought in Buddhist priests and 
institutions, one might have expected them to have spoken out more about 
postwar issues related to the “holy war” and the wartime imperial system, 
whether U.S. bases as Ichikawa urged them to do, or Yasukuni Shrine, text­
books that obfuscate Japanese aggression, rightist attacks on those who have 
raised the issue of the Emperor Hirohito’s war responsibility,64 or such 
threats to the democratic bulwark against a resurgence of belligerent imperi­
alism as the lack of a rigorously independent judiciary and the social and 
political positioning—close to those in power—of ultra-nationalist groups in 
Japan. Ichikawa argues that if Zen indeed did have a viable postwar ethic, it 
would not ignore these domestic problems.65 The task for Zen, then, is to 
answer the question, “How can Zen close the gap between its religious char­
acter of ‘eternal revolution’ and traditional [Japanese] Buddhist ethics char­
acterized by conservatism and a reactionary character in which customs and 
authority hold sway?”66 To Ichikawa’s way of thinking, “Zen ethics begins 
in the freedom to criticize the imperial system,”67 especially insofar as 
“killing the Buddha” is a core part of Zen. Without that criticism, no rigor­
ous Zen social ethic can be established.68 One might add here that a rigorous 
Zen ethic must move beyond mere criticism or the formulation of new
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Buddhist theories of ethics and proceed to praxis, to active, public responses 
to problems.69 70
69 Such a consideration of both responsibility and responding could benefit from H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s notion of “the responsible self” as a responsive being, whose actions are “re­
sponses, answers, to actions upon us.” (Niebuhr 1963, p. 56).
70 In a sense, the Buddhist version of what David Jones highlights as a core ethical con­
struct, the “prima facie duty not to harm others” (Jones 1999, pp. 6-7).
71 Obviously, the Japanese in the early-Showa period were not the only Buddhists in histo­
ry to have fallen short of Buddhist ideals.
72 Historically, while in its monasteries Zen may have continually spoken truth to
The moral accounting of what Zen Buddhists said and did during the war 
can perhaps best be done internally, that is, in terms of Buddhist values, not 
with an external touchstone like Western liberal values. The key question is 
not what Buddhist actions during the war were “anti-democratic,” “co- 
opted,” or “fascist”—adjectives implying extra-Buddhist criteria—but what 
actions stood in tension with core Buddhist values like non-harming (Skt. 
ahimsa),™ wisdom, and compassion.71 Needless to say, for a tradition 
steeped in Confucianism, the doctrine of debt (on ®), and historical symbio­
sis between the Buddha’s law (buppo IAS, or the Dharma) and the ruler’s 
law (obd 3TA, or the laws of the land), the prolegomenon here might be the 
question of which Zen Buddhist values to use as one’s touchstone. This ques­
tion points to what may be a more crucial issue—more even than war respon­
sibility—for possible Zen ethicists in Japan: while Zen has been colored by 
Confucianism for centuries as one of its constitutive elements, to what extent 
do Confucian values stand in tension with overall Mahayana Buddhist 
ethics? For centuries Confucian thinkers have addressed this incommensura­
bility—often in polemical tracts—but little has transpired on the Zen side.
There is, however, an arguably more important question: how have Zen’s 
Confucian leanings, central focus on meeting the ritual needs of parishioners 
(many of whom do not expect or want their priests to be activists), symbiot­
ic relationship with those in power, and, by extension, overall historical sup­
port of the social, political, and economic status quo, made Zen a highly 
embedded religion in Japan, positioned well historically to maintain institu­
tional security and provide useful service to Japanese society, yet unable and 
unwilling to take critical (prophetic) stances toward political leaders, the 
state, or government policies? Indeed, as a thoroughly embedded Japanese 
religion, Zen generally failed before and during the war to tap the universal 
resources in the Mahayana tradition of which it is part.72 One way Zen might 
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prepare for future ethical challenges is to assess the moral and political costs 
of its historical embeddedness and consider ways to cultivate a type of 
“response ability” that is informed by the more universal if not transcendent 
elements of Buddhism.
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ignorance, in Japanese society it has rarely spoken truth to power. And though Zen ethicists 
may not choose to go the route of liberation theologian Gustavo Gutierrez’s “option for the 
poor,” if he were alive today Ichikawa would probably urge them to at least criticize what one 
might term Zen’s traditional “option for the elite” and “option for the status quo.”
34
